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Abstract
We investigate the coordination and control problems of distributed discrete event systems that are composed of
multiple subsystems subject to potential actuator and/or sensor faults. We model actuator faults as local controllability
loss of certain actuator events and sensor faults as observability failure of certain sensor readings, respectively. Starting
from automata-theoretic models that characterize behaviors of the subsystems in the presence of faulty actuators
and/or sensors, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of actuator and sensor fault tolerant
supervisors, respectively, and synthesize appropriate local post-fault supervisors to prevent the post-fault subsystems
from jeopardizing local safety requirements. Furthermore, we apply an assume-guarantee coordination scheme to the
controlled subsystems for both the nominal and faulty subsystems so as to achieve the desired specifications of the
system. A multi-robot coordination example is used to illustrate the proposed coordination and control architecture.
Index Terms
Discrete event systems, supervisor synthesis, sensor and actuator faults, fault tolerant control, coordination.
I. INTRODUCTION
The ubiquitous deployment of information technology (IT) components has enabled persistent monitoring, coordi-
nation and control of large-scale engineering systems with distributed architectures, such as power grids, intelligent
transportation systems, cooperative robotic teams and so on. Nevertheless, the application of the heterogeneous
IT components has also made the system architectures more sophisticated, rendering them more vulnerable to
unpredictable faults that may cause undesired or even catastrhophic consequences. Hence, how to detect and
diagnose faults and how to guarantee safe and reliable operation of the engineering systems when faults occur
are of great practical importance.
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Due to the fact that operation of many engineering systems show strong event-driven features, discrete event
system (DES) [1] models have become particularly useful for the study of both fault diagnosis and isolation (FDI)
and fault tolerant control (FTC) problems [2] over the past decades. Initiated by Sampath et al. [3] in which faults
are modeled as unobservable events, many contributions have been made to solving the FDI problem of systems
modeled as DESs from different aspects, see, e.g., [4]–[8] and the references therein.
Despite the extensive studies on the FDI problem, relatively less work has been done on the FTC problem
of DESs. In [9], a framework is established for synthesizing supervisors for DESs to accomplish both desired
and tolerable control objectives. Resilience and fault tolerance of Petri nets are assured in [10] by using system
reconfigurations. Inspired by the adaptive and robust supervisory control techniques [11], respectively, the faults
can be addressed using either a passive or an active approach [2]. The passive FTC is achieved via robust control
techniques and a unified controller is designed to ensure that the closed-loop system remains insensitive to certain
faults. In contrast, the active FTC requires a controller that adapts its control policies in case of a fault detection.
By following a passive approach, Rohloff [12] derives a robust supervisor to assure fault tolerance in which a
sensor fault may take place, whereas Sa´nchez and Montoya [13] expand this method by taking safety enforcement
into consideration. By assuming some events to be not possible in the presence of a fault, Su¨lek and Schmidt [14]
present necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a fault tolerant supervisor. Wen et al. [15] adopt
a passive FTC architecture and present the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a unique fault
tolerant supervisor that can enforce a nominal specification for the non-faulty plant and a tolerable specification for
the overall plant. The passive FTC approach is also applied in [16] for cooperative tasking of multi-agent systems
modeled as DESs. To cope with supervisor faults, the reliable supervisory control problem is addressed in [17] and
[18] via a passive approach. On the other hand, an active FTC framework of DESs that involves fault detection
is presented in [19] to reconfigure the controller so that desired post-fault performance can be met. Darabi et al.
[20] propose an active FTC method to address faulty sensors by developing a control-switching theory. Paoli et
al. [21] propose an active FTC framework by safely switching to a post-fault supervisor in response to the online
diagnostic information. State-feedback and state-estimate-feedback supervisors are designed in [22] to ensure active
fault tolerance and safety of a DES. Most of the aforementioned results, however, deal with a centralized monolithic
system; whereas the FTC problem of DESs with distributed architectures are not considered.
In this paper, we assume that each subsystem of distributed DESs that are composed of some subsystems is
modeled as a finite automaton and is controlled by a nominal supervisor so that a global specification can be
achieved. The fault tolerance property requires that the nominal and fault-pruned subsystems coordinate so as to
fulfill the control specification after occurrences of the faults. We propose an active approach for the FTC problem
of the distributed DESs subject to possible loss of actuating and sensing capabilities. Specifically, by modeling
actuator faults as loss of local controllability of certain actuator events, an active FTC architecture is developed
in which the local supervisor is reconfigured to achieve a degraded but safe post-fault performance. Secondly, by
characterizing sensor faults as permanent observability failure of certain sensor readings, we develop an automata-
theoretic modeling framework of a controlled subsystem in the presence of various faulty sensors, upon which
appropriate local supervisors are carried out corresponding to different faulty modes of the subsystem. Furthermore,
we allow occurrences of multiple actuator and sensor faults, and we investigate the local FTC problem under
multiple faults by introducing a novel model of switching DESs. Finally, by leveraging the idea of compositional
verification [23], we present an assume-guarantee post-fault coordination architecture after the synthesis of local
post-fault supervisors so as to ensure the accomplishment of the global specification (with possible degradation).
Compared to our previous conference publication [24] on FTC of multi-agent systems modeled as DESs, we propose
different definitions of actuator and sensor faults along with novel synthesis methods of post-fault supervisors in this
paper. In addition, more rigorous coordination schemes among post-fault subsystems are developed by accounting
for safe operations of each subsystem with faults.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the supervisory control theory of DESs modeled as finite
automata. The actuator and sensor faults are defined in Section III and the fault tolerant coordination and control
problem is formulated. We present necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an actuator fault tolerant
supervisor and guidelines to test them in Section IV. Section V establishes necessary and sufficient conditions for
the existence of an sensor fault tolerant supervisor and presents a safe diagnosis and active sensor fault tolerant
control architecture. We exploit an assume-guarantee paradigm to achieve post-fault coordination in Section VI. A
multi-robot coordination example is used to illustrate the proposed fault tolerant coordination and control framework
in Section VII. Section VIII concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Let Σ be a finite set of events, and let 2Σ and |Σ| denote the power set and cardinality of Σ, respectively. Let Σ∗
denote the set of all finite-length strings over Σ plus the empty string . For any string w ∈ Σ∗, we denote by |w|
its length with || = 0. A language L over Σ is a subset L ⊆ Σ∗. We denote by L1−L2 the set-theoretic difference
of two languages L1 and L2. The prefix-closure of a language L is a set L := {s ∈ Σ∗|(∃t ∈ Σ∗)[st ∈ L]}. L
is said to be prefix-closed if L = L. For any string s ∈ Σ∗, we denote by L/s = {t ∈ Σ∗|st ∈ L} the set of
continuations of s in L.
A DES is modeled by a deterministic finite automaton (DFA) G = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, Qm), where Q is the finite set
of states, Σ is the finite set of events, δ : Q × Σ → Q is the (partial) transition function, q0 ∈ Q is the initial
state and Qm ⊆ Q is the set of marked states. The transition function δ can be extended to δ : Q × Σ∗ → Q
recursively by: δ(q, sσ) = δ(δ(q, s), σ), where q ∈ Q, s ∈ Σ∗ and σ ∈ Σ. The language generated by G is
defined by L(G) = {s ∈ Σ∗|δ(q0, s)!}, where δ(q0, s)! means that δ(q0, s) is defined. The language marked by G
is Lm(G) = {s ∈ Σ∗|s ∈ L(G), δ(q0, s) ∈ Qm}. We will omit Qm and write an automaton by G = (Q,Σ, δ, q0)
when marking is not considered. For any q ∈ Q, we denote by ActG(q) := {σ ∈ Σ|δ(q, σ)!} the set of events
defined at q.
For any subset Σ′ ⊆ Σ, the natural projection [1] PΣ′ from Σ∗ to Σ′∗ is a mapping PΣ′ : Σ∗ → Σ′∗ such that: (i)
PΣ′() = ; (ii) PΣ′(σ) = σ if σ ∈ Σ′ and PΣ′(σ) =  otherwise; (iii) ∀s ∈ Σ∗, σ ∈ Σ, PΣ′(sσ) = PΣ′(s)PΣ′(σ).
The corresponding inverse projection P−1Σ′ : Σ
′∗ → 2Σ∗ of PΣ′ is defined as P−1Σ′ (t) = {s ∈ Σ∗|PΣ′(s) = t}.
Functions PΣ′ and P−1Σ′ can be extended to a language by applying them to all the strings that belong to the
language.
The following notion of “property satisfaction” relation can then be defined in terms of the natural projection.
Definition 1 (Satisfaction): Given a system modeled by a DFA M = (Q,ΣM , δ, q0,M , Qm,M ) and a property
P that is marked by a DFA P = (QP ,ΣP , δP , q0,P , Qm,P ) with ΣP ⊆ ΣM , the system M is said to satisfy P ,
written as M |= P , if and only if ∀t ∈ Lm(M) : PP (t) ∈ Lm(P ), where PP is the natural projection from Σ∗M to
Σ∗P .
Remark 1: When ΣM = ΣP , Definition 1 reduces to the language inclusion Lm(M) ⊆ Lm(P ). When both
Qm,M and Qm,P are omitted, the satisfaction relation is equivalent to (∀t ∈ L(M))[PP (t) ∈ L(P )].
In the Ramadge-Wonham supervisory control theory of DESs modeled as finite automata [25], [26], the event set
Σ is partitioned into the set of controllable events Σc and the set of uncontrollable events Σuc. When the uncontrolled
system is partially observed, Σ is also partitioned into the set of observable events Σo and the set of unobservable
events Σuo. We associate with Σo the natural projection Po : Σ∗ → Σ∗o. A control decision γ ∈ 2Σ is said to be
admissible if Σuc ⊆ γ, i.e., uncontrollable events can never be disabled. We define Γ = {γ ∈ 2Σ|Σuc ⊆ γ} as the
set of admissible control decisions. Since a supervisor can only make decisions based on its observations, a partial-
observation supervisor is a mapping S : Po[L(G)] → Γ; more specifically, when the plant G generates a string
s, the supervisor observes Po(s) and enables events in S[Po(s)] accordingly. In practice, the supervisor S is often
implemented as a DFA S = (Z,Σ, ξ, z0, Zm) such that: (i) for each z ∈ Z and σ ∈ Σuo, ξ(z, σ)! ⇒ ξ(z, σ) = z;
(ii) for each s ∈ L(S), ActS(ξ(s)) = S[Po(s)]. The closed-loop behaviors generated by G under the supervision
of S are then given by L(S‖G), where S‖G represents the parallel composition of two DFAs S and G [1], [27].
Given a non-empty and prefix-closed specification language L = L over Σ, L is controllable (with respect to
G and Σuc) if LΣuc ∩ L(G) ⊆ L; L is observable (with respect to G and Σo) if (∀s, t ∈ L, σ ∈ Σ) [Po(s) =
Po(t) ∧ sσ ∈ L ∧ tσ ∈ L(G)⇒ tσ ∈ L]. It is well known that there exists a supervisor S such that L(S‖G) = L
if and only if L is controllable and observable [1], [25], [26], [28]; in this case, a DFA S = (Z,Σ, ξ, z0) such
that L(S) = L suffices to be a satisfactory supervisor. Otherwise, a supervisor S can be synthesized to satisfy L
in a maximally permissive manner, i.e., L(S‖G) ⊆ L and for any other S′ such that L(S′‖G) ⊆ L, it holds that
L(S‖G) 6⊂ L(S′‖G) [29].
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Distributed Discrete Event Systems subject to Faults
The distributed DES G under consideration is composed of n collaborating subsystems with unique identities,
namely I = {1, 2, . . . , n}. Each subsystem is modeled as an accessible [1] DFA Gi = (Qi,Σi, δi, qi,0) (i ∈ I).
The global event set is defined as Σ = ∪i∈IΣi and we denote by Pi the natural projection from Σ∗ to Σ∗i . For any
σ ∈ Σ, we denote by In(σ) = {i ∈ I|σ ∈ Σi}. For each i ∈ I , the local event set Σi is partitioned into the set of
locally controllable events Σi,c and the set of locally uncontrollable events Σi,uc. We assume that
(∀i, j ∈ I : i 6= j)[Σi,uc ∩ Σj,c = ∅]. (1)
Σi is partitioned into the set of locally observable events Σi,o and the set of locally unobservable events Σi,uo. Let
Pi,o denote the natural projection from Σ∗i to Σ
∗
i,o. All the subsystems are coordinated via parallel composition,
i.e., G = ‖i∈IGi.
We are interested in the faults that may interfere with the nominal functionalities of the actuators and/or sensors
equipped with the subsystems. In particular, we assume that the nominal supervisor Si implements the control
decisions on the subsystem Gi (i ∈ I) via Ki local actuators:
Σi,a = {ηi,1, ηi,2, . . . , ηi,Ki} ⊆ Σi,c ∩ Σi,o. (2)
More specifically, for any ηi,m ∈ Σi,a (m ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Ki}), we assume that In(ηi,m) = {i}; in other words,
an actuator can only be enabled or disabled by its own local supervisor. The actuators in Σi,a are assumed to be
vulnerable to malfunctions, and we refer to hi,m as the actuator fault event corresponding to the case in which the
supervisor loses the local controllability of the actuator event ηi,m in Gi.
Definition 2 (Actuator Faults): For m ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Ki}, an actuator fault hi,m occurred in the subsystem Gi
(i ∈ I) indicates that the actuator event ηi,m ∈ Σi,a becomes locally uncontrollable for Gi. The set of possible
actuator fault events in Gi is represented by the set ΣFi,a = {hi,1, hi,2, . . . , hi,Ki}.
According to Definition 2, an undesired control action may not be prohibited by a local supervisor as a conse-
quence of an actuator fault; this setting is hence consistent with the general understanding of actuator faults [30].
We assume that an actuator fault is permanent and local controllability of a fault actuator cannot be recovered after
the fault.
In addition to actuators, for the purpose of monitoring and controlling the subsystem Gi (i ∈ I), we denote by
Σi,s = {σi,1, σi,2, . . . , σi,Ni} ⊆ Σi,o ∩ Σi,uc (3)
the set of local sensor readings whose occurrences can be detected by the local supervisor Si. In general, the local
observability of the sensor readings in Σi,s is suspicious of loss [13], [31]; such a situation may correspond to the
breakdown of the sensors that monitor and record the occurrences of the event. Other than actuators, it is reasonable
to assume a sensor reading to be locally uncontrollable since the local supervisor shall not prevent a sensor reading
from being received. For all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Ni}, we use a sensor fault event fi,k to capture the circumstance that
the sensor reading σi,k ∈ Σi,s fails to be obtained by Si .
Definition 3 (Sensor Faults): For k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Ni}, a sensor fault fi,k occurred in the subsystem Gi (i ∈ I)
refers to as the loss of local observability of the sensor reading σi,k ∈ Σi,s. The set of possible sensor fault events
in Gi is represented by the set ΣFi,s = {fi,1, fi,2, . . . , fi,Ni}.
We assume that observability loss of a subsystem’s sensor reading is also permanent. To distinguish a faulty
sensor reading from a nominal one, we attach a fault label to the corresponding sensor reading event after it fails
to be accessed, resulting in the following set of faulty sensor readings:
Σfi,s := {σfi,k|σi,k ∈ Σi,s}. (4)
B. Problem Statement
Given a non-empty and prefix-closed control specification L ⊆ L(G) for the distributed DES G, it is shown in
the literature [32], [33] that under the assumption (1), a nominal supervisor Si (i ∈ I) can be synthesized for Gi
such that L(Si‖Gi) = Li and ‖i∈ILi ⊆ L. Under the supervision of Si (i ∈ I), no undesired behaviors will be
generated from the subsystem Gi in the nominal operation. However, undesired strings can arise due to the effective
control actions of the nominal supervisor on the faulty subsystem. In this case, a fault tolerant coordination and
control is required so as to enforce the accomplishment of the global specification before and after the occurrences
of potential faults.
It is also required that safe operation of all the subsystems of G be assured in spite of possible loss of local
actuating and/or sensing capabilities. The local safety requirements are captured by a non-empty and prefix-closed
safety language Lsafei ⊆ L(Gi) associated with each subsystem Gi (i ∈ I), which includes all the tolerable
behaviors of Gi that should be satisfied (in the sense of Definition 1) in both nominal and fault-pruned operations.
Without loss of generality, we assume that Li ⊆ Lsafei holds for all i ∈ I . Formally, the problem that is addressed
in this paper can be stated as follows.
Problem 1: Consider a distributed DES G = ‖i∈IGi in which Gi (i ∈ I) is controlled by a nominal supervisor
Si (i ∈ I) in order to satisfy the local safety Lsafei and the prefix-closed global specification L. Suppose that for
each i ∈ I , subsystem Gi is equipped with actuators Σi,a and sensor readings Σi,s that may be subject to faults,
find a family SFi of post-fault supervisors for the subsystem Gi such that:
(i) the local safety requirements shall always be satisfied despite the actuator and sensor faults, i.e., SFi ‖GFi |=
Lsafei , where G
F
i denotes the subsystem Gi subject to the faults;
(ii) for any subset I ′ ∈ 2I of subsystems whose behaviors are influenced by faults and for any i ∈ I ′, SFi will
steer the faulty subsystems in order to meet the global specification, i.e., (‖i∈I−I′Si‖Gi) ‖
(‖j∈I′SFj ‖GFj ) |= L.
In this paper, objective (i) of Problem 1 is achieved by local fault tolerant control reconfiguration of the post-fault
subsystem(s) (cf. Sections IV and V). Objective (ii) will be fulfilled by leveraging the idea of assume-guarantee
post-fault coordination (cf. Section VI), in which the synthesized post-fault supervisors will be further refined if
necessary to fulfill the global specification.
IV. AN ACTIVE FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL ARCHITECTURE WITH ACTUATOR FAULTS
From Definition 2, an actuator fault leads to unexpected loss of (local) controllability of the corresponding actuator
event; in other words, the generated language of the controlled subsystem Si‖Gi may deviate from the presumed
local behaviors Li in a faulty mode, since the local supervisor Si can no longer disable a faulty actuator event so
as to prevent an undesired string from being generated. As a consequence, the presence of the faulty actuator may
jeopardize the accomplishment of the global specification L. In this section, by assuming that actuator fault events
are locally observable, we aim at tackling the actuator fault tolerant control problem with an active approach [2].
A. Construction of Subsystems subject to an Actuator Fault
Since Σi,a ⊂ Σi,o holds both before and after the occurrence of an actuator fault, therefore we can assume that
an actuator fault can be detected instantly by means of FDI techniques; i.e., for any i ∈ I and m ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Ki},
hi,m is assumed to be locally observable. The possible successive behaviors of a subsystem after the occurrence of
an actuator fault are characterized in terms of the following “suffix automaton”.
Definition 4 (Suffix Automaton): The suffix automaton of an accessible DFA G = (Q,Σ, δ, q0) following a string
t ∈ L(G) is another DFA Gsuf (t) = (Qsuf ,Σ, δsuf , qsuf0 ), where qsuf0 = δ(q0, t), Qsuf = {q ∈ Q|(∃s ∈
L(G)/t)[δ(qsuf0 , s) = q]}, and (∀q ∈ Qsuf , σ ∈ Σ)[δsuf (q, σ) = δ(q, σ) ∩Qsuf ].
It can be verified that the suffix automaton Gsuf (t) preserves all the possible successive behaviors of the DES
G after the string t, i.e., L
(
Gsuf (t)
)
= L(G)/t.
To prevent unsafe local behaviors from emerging in a faulty mode, the operation of the nominal supervisor should
be disabled and it is necessary to switch from the nominal supervisor to a new post-fault supervisor afterwards,
yielding an active approach to the actuator fault tolerance. For convenience of presentation, we assume that an
actuator ηi,m ∈ Σi,a (m = 1, 2, . . . ,Ki) becomes locally uncontrollable in the subsystem Gi (i ∈ I) and the
actuator fault event hi,m is detected when a string ti,0 ∈ Li has been generated during the nominal operation. The
uncontrolled post-fault subsystem Gi corresponding to the generation of ti,0 and the detection of hi,m, written as
Gm,ai (ti,0), is defined as
Gm,ai (ti,0) = G
suf
i (ti,0), (5)
where different from Gi, the controllability and observability status of the post-fault event set Σ
m,a
i is given by
Σm,ai,c = Σi,c − {ηi,m},Σm,ai,uc = Σi,uc ∪ {ηi,m, hi,m}, (6)
and
Σm,ai,o = Σi,o ∪ {hi,m},Σm,ai,uo = Σi,uo, (7)
respectively. Note that the actuator fault event is not locally controllable. The following example illustrates the
construction of the post-fault model of a given subsystem in the form of a suffix automaton.
Example 1: For a subsystem Gi shown in Fig. 1, in which Qi = {qi,0, qi,1, qi,2, qi,3} and Σi = {ηi,1, ηi,2, ηi,3, ηi,4},
we assume that Σi,c = Σi,a = Σi.
q0start q1 q2 q3
ηi,1
ηi,2
ηi,3 ηi,4
ηi,2
Fig. 1: The subsystem Gi in the nominal mode.
If the actuator ηi,2 becomes faulty while Gi generates a string ti,0 = ηi,1ηi,2ηi,1ηi,3 in the nominal mode, then it
follows from (5) that the post-fault subsystem G2,ai is a suffix automaton of Gi and its initial state following should
qsuf0start q
suf
1
ηi,4
ηi,2
Fig. 2: The post-fault subsystem G2,ai (ti,0).
be qsufi,0 = δ(qi,0, ti,0) = qi,2. From Definition 4, the set of states of G
2,a
i is computed as Q
suf
i = {qsufi,0 , qsufi,1 } =
{qi,2, qi,3}. The post-fault subsystem G2,ai is therefore illustrated in Fig. 2, with ηi,2 being locally uncontrollable.
B. Active Fault Tolerant Control under a Faulty Actuator
Starting from the post-fault uncontrolled subsystem Gm,ai , a set of requirements are posed on the subsystem’s
controlled behaviors in the faulty mode, resulting in a degraded post-fault specification Lposti , which in general is a
prefix-closed sublanguage of L(Gm,ai ). In this paper, we require that the post-fault supervisor S
m,a
i be synthesized
so that the local safety Lsafei can be maintained. Specifically, if hi,m is detected when a string ti,0 is generated,
the post-fault specification for Gm,ai is given by:
Lposti (ti,0) = L
safe
i /ti,0. (8)
It can be inferred from Definition 4 and the prefix-closeness of Lsafei that L
post
i (ti,0) is a prefix-closed sublanguage
of L(Gm,ai (ti,0)). Considering the post-fault specification L
post
i (ti,0), the following notion of actuator fault tolerance
is presented to justify Gm,ai ’s capability of assuring local safety.
Definition 5 (Actuator Fault Tolerance): Language L (Gm,ai (ti,0)) (i ∈ I) is said to be actuator fault tolerant
with respect to the faulty actuator ηi,m ∈ Σi,a and the string ti,0 ∈ Li if there exists a non-empty sublanguage of
Lposti (ti,0) that is controllable with respect to G
m,a
i (ti,0) and Σ
m,a
i,uc and observable with respect to G
m,a
i (ti,0) and
Σm,ai,o .
A general architecture is depicted in Fig. 3 to achieve active fault tolerant control of the subsystem Gi (i ∈ I) in
the presence of an faulty actuator ηi,m. In the nominal mode, no actuator fault takes place and the control loop is
closed on the nominal supervisor Si that enables appropriate locally controllable events based on the observation
Pi,o(ti,0) when the subsystem generates a string ti,0. Once the actuator ηi,m becomes faulty, the actuator fault event
hi,m is generated to interrupt the nominal operation of Si to prevent any unsafe behaviors from emerging in Gi.
In this case, we test the actuator fault tolerance of the post-fault subsystem Gm,ai (ti,0) and if the actuator fault
tolerance holds , there must exist a post-fault supervisor Sm,ai that steers G
m,a
i to fulfill the post-fault specification
Lposti (ti,0).
We now study the procedure of testing the actuator fault tolerance property after an actuator fault. Thanks to the
standard inf C(·) operator, which computes the infimal prefix-closed controllable sublanguage of a given language
with respect to another given language and a given set of uncontrollable events [1], we present the following theorem
that states the necessary and sufficient conditions of the actuator fault tolerance of L (Gm,ai (ti,0)).
Theorem 1: Language L (Gm,ai (ti,0)) is actuator fault tolerant with respect to ηi,m and ti,0 if and only if language
inf Cm,ai ({}), computed with respect to L (Gm,ai (ti,0)) and Σm,ai,uc , satisfies that inf Cm,ai ({}) ⊆ Lposti (ti,0).
Fig. 3: An actuator fault tolerant control architecture of Gi.
Proof: By construction, inf Cm,ai ({}) computed with respect to L (Gm,ai (ti,0)) contains all the shortest
continuations of ti,0 in L (G
m,a
i (ti,0)) after the detection of hi,m, in which the post-fault subsystem can be controlled,
i.e., all the possible evolutions of Gm,ai after disabling all the local events that can be feasibly disabled. Suppose
that there exists a string si,0 ∈ inf Cm,ai ({}) but si,0 6∈ Lposti (ti,0), this means that there is no way to prevent
the string ti,0si,0 ∈ L(Gi) − Lsafei from emerging in Gi, which clearly leads to a violation of the actuator fault
tolerance of Gm,ai .
Conversely, suppose that the actuator fault tolerance of L (Gm,ai (ti,0)) fails to be satisfied with respect to some
ηi,m and ti,0, i.e., there does not exist a post-fault supervisor S
m,a
i that can steer G
m,a
i to satisfy L
post
i (ti,0). In this
case, there always exists at least one string si,0 ∈ L (Gm,ai ) − Lposti (ti,0) that is formed by uncontrollable events
in Σm,ai,uc (otherwise the occurrence of si,0 can be prohibited a priori by simply disabling any locally controllable
event in the string). Since inf Cm,ai ({}) enumerates all the concatenations of locally uncontrollable events feasible
in L(Gm,ai (ti,0)), it holds that si,0 ∈ inf Cm,ai ({}); therefore inf Cm,ai ({}) 6⊆ Lposti (ti,0) is satisfied, which leads
to a contradiction.
Theorem 1 presents the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a post-fault supervisor that ensures
local safety. Once an actuator ηi,m becomes faulty, a local supervisor that achieves inf C
m,a
i ({}) suffices to be
a post-fault supervisor; however, it may not yield a satisfactory solution as inf Cm,ai ({}) may be too restrictive.
To efficiently compute a satisfactory Sm,ai , we associate the the subsystem Gi (i ∈ I) with the following bank of
safety supervisors:
Sai = {Smi |m ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Ki}, L(Smi ‖Gi) ⊆ Lsafei }, (9)
where each safety supervisor Smi ∈ Si can be synthesized offline such that Lmi = L(Smi ‖Gi) ⊆ Lsafei is satisfied in
a maximally permissive manner, under the assumption that ηi,m is locally uncontrollable. In the case that ti,0 ∈ Lmi
for the string ti,0 before the detection of hi,m, S
m,a
i can be implemented offline and is given by the following
suffix automaton of Smi after the generation of ti,0, i.e.,
Sm,ai = S
msuf
i (ti,0). (10)
It then follows from (10) that
L (Sm,ai ‖Gm,ai ) = L(Smi ‖Gi)/ti,0
⊆ Lsafei /ti,0 = Lposti (ti,0).
Therefore, as long as Gm,ai (ti,0) is actuator fault tolerant, S
m,a
i (10) can be extracted from S
m
i ∈ Smi and is
sufficient to fulfill the post-fault specification.
On the other hand, if ti,0 6∈ Lmi , the safety supervisor Smi cannot be applied directly to synthesize Sm,ai . In this
case, the computational complexity of synthesizing an offline post-fault supervisor is exponential in the number of
states in Gm,ai ; therefore, we adopt online control techniques for the synthesis of S
m,a
i (see, e.g., [34], [35]), which
generally possess polynomial complexity at each locally observable event along a trajectory in Lposti .
C. Fault Tolerant Control with Multiple Actuator Faults
In the previous subsection, we discussed local fault tolerant control under the assumption that there are no
consecutive occurrences of multiple actuator faults. However, multiple faults may occur in many practical engineering
systems. Therefore, it is necessary to extend the proposed active fault tolerant control architecture to address multiple
actuator faults. In the presence of multiple faults, the subsystem shall then switch from either the nominal mode to
a faulty mode, or one faulty mode to another. We introduce the following set of mode-switching events to handle
multiple faults in Gi,
Σswi,a = {hm1,m2i |m1,m2 ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . . ,Ki},
m1 6= m2,m2 6= 0},
(11)
where we denote by the 0-th mode the nominal mode. The mode-switching event hm1,m2i is generated when ηi,m2
becomes faulty in the m1-th faulty mode. For convenience of presentation, we write h
0,m
i = hi,m, indicating
the switch from the nominal mode to the m-th faulty mode. It is reasonable to assume m2 6= 0 in (11) since
the subsystem cannot return to the nominal mode from a faulty one. Similar to the actuator fault events, all the
mode-switching events in Σswi,a are assumed to be locally observable.
We study the case in which actuators ηi,1, ηi,2, . . . , ηi,Ki of the subsystem Gi may become faulty. When there is
no fault, the subsystem stays in the nominal mode, the fault tolerant control is inactive. After some faults occur and
the subsystem enters a faulty mode, the active fault tolerant control framework depicted in Fig. 3 is inherited here
to resolve the impacts of the faults. Without loss of generality, we still assume that the first actuator fault occurs
when a string ti,0 is generated in Gi. Thus the uncontrolled post-fault subsystem model of Gi in the presence of
multiple faults is given by
GF,ai (ti,0) = G
suf
i (ti,0). (12)
Furthermore, we consider that the actuator faults may occur in arbitrary orders. Toward this regards, we define the
controllable and observable events in the presence of Ki possible faulty actuators as follows, respectively:
ΣF,ai,c = Σi,c − ∪Kim=1{ηi,m} = Σi,c − Σi,a,
ΣF,ai,uc = Σi,uc ∪ Σi,a ∪ Σswi,a;
ΣF,ai,o = Σi,o ∪ Σswi,a,ΣF,ai,uo = Σi,uo.
(13)
The local control objective of the post-fault supervisor for the subsystem Gi subject to multiple actuator faults is
to guarantee the accomplishment of the local safety specification Lsafei . Therefore, the post-fault specification is
obtained as
Lposti (ti,0) = L
safe
i /ti,0. (14)
Since hm1,m2i ∈ Σswi,a is locally observable, we can disable the operation of the nominal supervisor Si when the
first actuator ηi,m fails to be locally controllable and h
0,m
i is detected for some m ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Ki}. Following the
detection of the mode-switching event, we require that the post-fault supervisor SF,ai be synthesized in order to
ensure the post-fault specification Lposti (ti,0) in the presence of arbitrary switch among various faulty modes. The
solvability of the fault tolerant control problem under multiple actuator faults is given below.
Theorem 2: There exists a post-fault supervisors SF,ai that can steer the faulty subsystem G
F,a
i (i ∈ I) to satisfy
Lposti (ti,0) (14) in the presence of faulty actuators in Σi,a if and only if language inf C
F,a
i ({}), computed with
respect to L(GF,ai (ti,0)) and Σ
F,a
i,uc, satisfies that inf C
F,a
i ({}) ⊆ Lposti (ti,0).
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 and is omitted.
To implement the post-fault supervisor in the multi-fault case, a safety supervisor Sai can be synthesized offline
to accomplish Lsafei in a maximally permissive manner on condition that all actuator events in Σi,a are locally
uncontrollable. Thanks to the safety supervisor Sai , if the string ti,0 ∈ Li before the detection of the first mode-
switching event satisfies that ti,0 ∈ L(Sai ‖Gi), then similar to the single-fault case (10), a satisfactory post-fault
supervisor SF,ai can be implemented offline as
SF,ai = S
asuf
i (ti,0). (15)
Otherwise, SF,ai shall be implemented via online control techniques [34], [35].
We use SFi ‖GFi to denote the overall closed-loop model of the subsystem Gi (i ∈ I) with potential faulty
actuators in Σi,a both prior to and after the detection of the first mode-switching events h
0,m
i ∈ Σswi,a for some
m. The following theorem states that the active fault tolerant architecture proposed in this section will steer the
subsystem Gi to ensure local safety.
Theorem 3: For the subsystem Gi (i ∈ I) that is equipped with local actuators in Σi,a whose local controllability
may fail in arbitrary orders, the switching among the nominal supervisor Si and the post-fault supervisors S
F,a
i
ensures the local safety specification Lsafei , i.e., S
F
i ‖GFi |= Lsafei .
Proof: With slightly abusing the notations, we use L
(
SFi ‖GFi
)
to denote the behaviors of the closed-loop
subsystem SFi ‖GFi . Since the post-fault supervisor SF,ai is synthesized to ensure the post-fault specification Lposti
regardless of the order of the actuator faults, therefore L
(
SFi ‖GFi
)
should contain the strings that are represented
in the form of the concatenation of strings from L(Si‖Gi) and strings from L
(
SF,ai ‖GF,ai
)
. Formally, we can
write that
L
(
SFi ‖GFi
)
=
{
ti,0h
0,m1
i ti,1h
m1,m2
i ti,2 · · ·
ti,Ki−1h
mKi−1,mKi
i ti,Ki
}
,
where m1,m2, . . . ,mKi is an enumeration of {1, 2, . . . ,Ki} and ti,0 ⊆ Li ⊆ Lsafei . Furthermore, according to
(14), it holds that
h0,m1i ti,1h
m1,m2
i ti,2 · · ·
ti,mKi−1h
mKi−1,mKi
i ti,mKi ⊆ L
post
i
= Lsafei /ti,0.
Let PF,ai be the natural projection from
[
Σi ∪ Σswi,a
]∗
to Σ∗i . We can then write that
PF,ai
[
L
(
SF,ai ‖GF,ai
)]
= ti,0ti,1 · · · ti,Ki ⊆ Lsafei (16)
can always be satisfied. By Definition 1, (16) is equivalent to SFi ‖GFi |= Lsafei , which completes the proof.
V. SAFE SUPERVISORY CONTROL WITH SENSOR FAULTS
This section is concerned with the synthesis of the local post-fault supervisor for a subsystem whose nominal
operation suffers from sensor faults. The proposed fault tolerant supervisory control scheme includes two major
ingredients: (i) construction of an automaton model of the subsystem in the presence of local sensor faults; (ii)
synthesis of the corresponding post-fault supervisor(s) after the sensor faults.
A. Modeling Sensor Faults in Discrete Event Systems
Let G0i = Si‖Gi denote the nominal mode of the subsystem Gi (i ∈ I) under control. Since undesired behaviors
may arise after occurrences of potential faults as a consequence of executing nominal supervision commands on the
fault-pruned subsystem, we aim at exploring the behaviors generated by G0i when one sensor reading σi,k ∈ Σi,s
becomes faulty. As defined in (3), the suspicious sensor readings in Σfi,s introduce Ni faulty modes to the subsystem
Gi in addition to the nominal mode. For k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Ni}, we assume that the k-th faulty mode of Gi is modeled
as
Gi,k = (Qi,k,Σi,k, δi,k), k = 1, 2, . . . , Ni, (17)
where Qi,k = {qi,k,l|qi,l ∈ Qi} is a copy of Qi, Σi,k = Σi ∪{fi,k, σfi,k}, and the transition function δi,k is defined
as follows: for any qi,k,l ∈ Qi,k and σ ∈ Σi,k,
δi,k(qi,k,l, σ) =
qi,k,l
′ , if σ ∈ Σi ∧ δi(qi,l, σ) = qi,l′ ;
qi,k,l′ , if σ = σ
f
i,k ∧ δi(qi,l, σi,k) = qi,l′ .
Note that the initial state qi,k,0 of Gi,k is not specified at this point since it depends on at which state of Gi the
sensor fault fi,k occurs. Furthermore, we define the transition δi,k(qi,l, σ
f
i,k) in addition to δi,k(qi,l, σi,k) in the k-th
faulty mode. For convenience of presentation, we also use fi,k to denote the associated mapping
fi,k : Qi → Qi,k, k = 1, 2, . . . , Ni,
i.e., the sensor fault fi,k indicates the transition from the nominal mode Gi to the k-th faulty mode Gi,k. In other
words, fi,k(qi,l) = qi,k,l indicates that fi,k occurs when Gi evolves to qi,l and the initial state of Gi,k turns to be
qi,k,l. Since we pose no assumption on when the sensor fault may occur, the unified model of Gi subject to one
suspicious sensor reading σi,k can then be constructed as
Gki = (Q
k
i ,Σ
k
i , δ
k
i , q
k
i,0), (18)
where Qki = Qi ∪Qi,k, Σki = Σi,k, qki,0 = qi,0, with the transition function δki = δi ∪ δi,k ∪ {(qi,l, fi,k, qi,k,l)|qi,l ∈
Qi}.
In addition to Gki , we proceed to the construction of S
k
i , which is the counterpart of Si in the k-th faulty mode.
For convenience of presentation, we assume that the nominal supervisor Si can be realized as the following DFA:
Si = (Xi,Σi, ξ
0
i , xi,0). (19)
Similar to Gi,k, we also use Si,k to denote the potential behaviors of Si in the k-th faulty mode; more specifically,
Si,k is given by the following automaton without a specified initial state:
Si,k = (Xi,k,Σi,k, ξi,k), k = 1, 2, . . . , Ni,
where Xi,k = {xi,k,l|xi,l ∈ Xi}, and for any xi,k,l ∈ Xi,k and σ ∈ Σi,k, ξi,k(xi,k,l, σ) is formally defined as
ξi,k(xi,k,l, σ) =

xi,k,l′ , if ξi(xi,l, σ) = xi,l′ ;
xi,k,l, if [σ = σ
f
i,k ∧ ξi(xi,l, σi,k)!]∨
[σ ∈ Σi,uc ∪ {σfi,k} ∧ ¬ξi(xi,l, σ)!].
In other words, we make sure that uncontrollable events shall never be disabled regardless of possible sensor faults
by adding self-loops that are labeled by uncontrollable events and faulty sensor readings to all the states in the
faulty mode. Therefore, the unified model of Si in the presence of the unobservalbe sensor reading σ
f
i,k is obtained
as
Ski = (X
k
i ,Σ
k
i , ξ
k
i , x
k
i,0), (20)
where Xki = Xi ∪Xi,k, xki,0 = xi,0 and ξki = ξi ∪ ξi,k ∪ {(xi,l, fi,k, xi,k,l)|xi,l ∈ Xi}. Finally, by leveraging (18)
and (20), the closed-loop model of the controlled subsystem G0i in the presence of a faulty sensor reading σ
f
i,k is
computed as
Gk,si = S
k
i ‖Gki := (Qk,si ,Σk,si , δk,si , qk,si,0 ), (21)
where the set of post-fault local events is given by Σk,si = Σi ∪ {σfi,k, fi,k} and can be further partitioned as
Σk,si,c = Σi,c,Σ
k,s
i,uc = Σi,uc ∪ {σfi,k, fi,k};
Σk,si,o = Σi,o,Σ
k,s
i,uo = Σi,uo ∪ {σfi,k, fi,k}.
(22)
Note that each step (18)—(21) of the construction procedure of Gk,si requires no prior knowledge of the state at
which the sensor fault event occurs and hence can be computed offline.
We use the following example to demonstrate the construction procedure of Gk,si .
Example 2: (Rephrased from [30], Example 4) We consider a subsystem Gi (i ∈ I) whose DFA representation
is depicted in Fig. 4, where Σi = Σi,o = {a, b, c}, Σi,c = {a, c}. Let Σi,s = {b} be the set of suspicious sensor
readings. The safety language is given by Lsafei = ab+ ac, i.e., the state 5 (marked with double circles) is an
unsafe state. A nominal supervisor Si can be synthesized to ensure L
safe
i and is shown in Fig. 5.
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Fig. 4: The DFA model of Gi.
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Fig. 5: The DFA model of Si.
Next, following the construction procedures (18) and (20), we can compute Gki and S
k
i accordingly that are
shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, respectively.
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Fig. 6: The DFA model of Gki .
Finally, we can obtain Gk,si by composing G
k
i and S
k
i . As shown in Fig. 8, whenever the sensor fault fb takes
place before the occurrence of the sensor reading b, the closed-loop system may still allow the occurrence of unsafe
behaviors (in this example, we can see that the string afbbfc 6|= Lsafei ).
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Fig. 7: The DFA model of Ski .
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Fig. 8: The DFA model of Gk,si .
Remark 2: The construction procedure of Gk,si is similar to that of the closed-loop system subject to “sensor
erasure attack” in [30]. Nevertheless, we use the sensor fault event to clearly distinguish the nominal part of the
system from the faulty part. Furthermore, the procedure developed in [30] considers the worst-case scenario, whereas
by introducing the sensor fault event, we can see from Example 2 that if a sensor fault takes place after the last
occurrence of the corresponding sensor reading, the fault will pose no impact on the successive behaviors of the
system.
B. SF-safe Controllability and Sensor Fault Tolerant Control
By construction, Gk,si (i ∈ I) contains all the potential behaviors of the closed-loop subsystem subject to fi,k and
σfi,m. Two objectives need be fulfilled in order to achieve sensor fault tolerant control of G
k,s
i : (i) the occurrence
of sensor fault event fi,k should be unambiguously determined before G
k,s
i generates any unsafe behaviors; (ii) the
fault-pruned controlled subsystem should be able to stop its evolution before generating any unsafe strings.
Let Ψ(fi,k) = {t ∈ L(Gk,si )|t = t′fi,k, t′ ∈ Σk,s
∗
i } denote the set of all strings in L(Gk,si ) that end with the
sensor fault event fi,k. Let P ki,o : Σ
k,s∗
i → Σk,s
∗
i,o be the post-fault observation projection. We introduce a variant
of safe controllability [21], [30] in the context of active fault tolerant control, namely SF-safe controllability, to
achieve the aforementioned control objectives for a fault-pruned subsystem.
Definition 6 (SF-safe Controllability): Language L(Gk,si ) is SF-safe controllable with respect to the projection
P ki,o, the sensor fault event fi,k and the local safety property L
safe
i if
(∀si ∈ Ψ(fi,k))(∀ti ∈ L(Gk,si )/si)
[
(siti 6|= Lsafei )∧
(∀s′i ∈ siti − {siti}, s′i |= Lsafei )
]
⇒ SC,
(23)
where the safe controllability condition SC states as follows:
SC : (∃ti,1, ti,2 ∈ Σk,s
∗
i , ti = ti,1ti,2)[(
( 6 ∃wi ∈ L(Gk,si ))[P ki,o(wi) = P ki,o(siti,1) ∧ ffi,k 6∈ wi]
)
∧
(Σk,si,c ∈ ti,2)
]
.
(24)
Intuitively, L(Gk,si ) is SF-safe controllable if for any string ti in L(G
k,s
i ) following the sensor fault event fi,k that
may violate Lsafei (in the sense of Definition 1), there exists: (i) a proper prefix ti,1 of ti that assures the detection of
fi,k before the fault-pruned subsystem generates any unsafe behavior (safe diagnosable); (ii) a locally controllable
event after this prefix but still prior to the execution of the unsafe behavior (safe controllable). In other words, after
the detection of the fault, unsafe behaviors can always be prohibited by disabling this locally controllable event.
The above discussion is formally summarized as the following theorem, which asserts that SF-safe controllability
is the necessary and sufficient condition for Gk,si to ensure safety.
Theorem 4: The closed-loop subsystem Gk,si subject to the sensor fault fi,k will not generate any safety-violating
string (in the sense of Definition 1) if and only if it is SF-safe controllable with respect to P ki,o, fi,k and L
safe
i .
The occurrence of the sensor fault event fi,k is determined by a diagnoser. The construction procedure of the
diagnoser is presented in [3] and is omitted here. Before proceeding to the sensor fault tolerant control strategy for
Gk,si , we first review the concept of first-entered certain states in the diagnoser [21]
Definition 7 (First-entered Certain States): Let Gdi = (Q
d
i ,Σ
k,s
i,o , δ
d
i , q
d
i,0) be the diagnoser constructed for G
k,s
i
and P ki,o. Define Q
Y N
i = {q ∈ Qdi |q is uncertain}, QNi = {q ∈ Qdi |q is normal} and QYi = {q ∈ Qdi |q is certain}.
The set of first-entered certain states is FCi = {q ∈ QYi |(∃q′ ∈ QNi ∪QY Ni , σ ∈ Σk,si,o )[δdi (q′, σ) = q]}.
Let Qi,B = {q ∈ Qk,si |(∃s ∈ L(Gk,si ), δk,si (qk,si,0 , s) = q)[s 6|= Lsafei ]} denote the set of unsafe states in Gk,si . By
introducing Qi,B , Gdi can be modified as a safe diagnoser [36] and the SF-safe controllability of L(G
k,s
i ) can then
be verified offline, as stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1: Language L(Gk,si ) is SF-safe controllable with respect to P
k
i,o, fi,k and L
safe
i if and only if for
the safe diagnoser Gdi :
(i) there does not exist a state qY Ni = {(qk,si1 , li1), (qk,si2 , li2), . . . , (qk,siK , liK )} ∈ QY Ni such that ∃j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K},
lij = Y but q
k,s
ij
∈ Qi,B ;
(ii) there does not exist a state qYi = {(qk,si1 , Y ), (qk,si2 , Y ), . . . , (qk,siK , Y )} ∈ FCi such that ∃j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K},
qk,sij ∈ Qi,B ;
(iii) for any qYi = {(qk,si1 , Y ), (qk,si2 , Y ), . . . , (qk,siK , Y )} ∈ FCi and ∀j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}, there does not exist a state
qij′ ∈ Qi,B and a string s ∈ Σk,s
∗
i,uc such that qij′ = δ
k,s
i (qij , s).
Proof: Conditions (i) and (ii) are the necessary and sufficient conditions for safe diagnosability and the proof
is presented in [36]. The necessity and sufficiency of Condition (iii) follow immediately from Definition 6.
Example 3: Let us revisit Gk,si constructed in Example 2. From Fig. 8, we can see that the observation ac shall
correspond to the diagnoser state qi = {((3, 3), N), ((3′, 3′), Y ), ((3′, 5′), Y )}, which is an fi,k-uncertain state. On
the other hand, since (3′, 5′) is an unsafe state, thus Condition (i) in Proposition 1 fails to be satisfied and thus
L(Gk,si ) is not SF-safe controllable.
We adopt an active approach to address the loss of the sensor reading σi,k, as shown in Fig. 9. Different from
the actuator fault tolerant control, the sensor fault event fi,k is assumed to be locally unobservable and therefore,
detection of fi,k should be performed by associating G
k,s
i with the safe diagnoser G
d
i . If L(G
k,s
i ) is safe controllable
with respect to P ki,o, fi,k and L
safe
i , then any occurrence of the sensor fault fi,k can be determined by G
d
i without
generating any unsafe behaviors.
Fig. 9: Sensor fault tolerant control loop of Gk,si .
When Gdi reports that G
k,s
i has evolved to a first-entered certain state q
Y
i = {(qk,si1 , Y ), (qk,si2 , Y ), . . . , (qk,siK , Y )} ∈
FCi, the post-fault uncontrolled subsystem Gk,si (qYi ) can be formed by disabling the nominal supervisor Si then
taking the accessible part of of the uncontrolled faulty subsystem Gki starting from each qij , j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K}.
In order to make Gk,si (q
Y
i ) deterministic, we add a new initial state q
Y
i,0 and connect it with each qij with a
transition labeled as (qYi,0, detectj , qij ), where j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,K} and detectj is locally uncontrollable. The SF-
safe controllability of L(Gk,si ) indicates that there always exists a locally controllable event σj corresponding to
each j that can be disabled to prevent the subsystem from generating an unsafe string after evolving to qij . Let
tij ,0 ∈ L(Gk,si ) be the string such that δk,si (qk,si,0 , tij ,0) = qij . We require that local safety can still be assured after
the detection of the fault and the post-fault specification Lposti (q
Y
i ) is given by
Lposti (q
Y
i ) =
K⋃
j=1
detectj(L
safe
i /tij ,0), (25)
which turns to be a prefix-closed sublanguage of L(Gk,si (q
Y
i )). The following property of sensor fault tolerance is
hence formally defined in terms of Gk,si (q
Y
i ) and L
post
i (q
Y
i ).
Definition 8 (Sensor Fault Tolerance): Language L(Gk,si (q
Y
i )) is said to be sensor fault tolerant with respect
to fi,k and L
post
i (q
Y
i ) if there exists a non-empty sublanguage of L
post
i (q
Y
i ) that is controllable with respect to
Gk,si (q
Y
i ) and Σ
k,s
i,uc ∪{detectj |qij ∈ qYi } and observable with respect to Gk,si (qYi ) and Σk,si,o . L(Gk,si ) is said to be
sensor fault tolerant if for all qYi ∈ FCi, L(Gk,si (qYi )) is sensor fault tolerant with respect to Lposti (qYi ).
We present the following theorem that states the necessary and sufficient conditions for the sensor fault tolerance
of L(Gk,si (q
Y
i )).
Theorem 5: Language L(Gk,si (q
Y
i )) is sensor fault tolerant with respect to fi,k and L
post
i (q
Y
i ) if and only if
language inf Ck,si ({}), computed with respect to L(Gk,si (qYi )) and Σk,si,uc ∪ {detectj |qij ∈ qYi }, satisfies that
inf Ck,si ({}) |= Lposti (qYi ).
Proof: The theorem can be proved in a similar way as that of Theorem 1. Note that we use |= instead of ⊆
in this theorem due to the introduction of the detection event detectj for each distinct qij ∈ qYi .
Theorem 5 in fact guarantees the existence of a satisfactory post-fault supervisor. Since the fault-pruned subsystem
Gk,si and the corresponding safe diagnoser G
d
i can both be computed offline, all the possible post-fault transition
diagram of Gi after entering a state qYi ∈ FCi can also be obtained offline. Therefore, a post-fault supervisor
Sk,si (q
Y
i ) starting from the states in q
Y
i can be implemented online and the system shall switch to S
k,s
i (q
Y
i ) after
Gk,si visits any state in q
Y
i .
Remark 3: Although sensor fault tolerance of the subsystem Gi can always be assured by synthesizing the
nominal supervisor Si with respect to Σ
k,s
i,o rather than Σi,o in the first place; however, this approach would
presumably lead the controlled subsystem to perform more restrictive behaviors.
C. Fault Tolerant Control with Multiple Faulty Sensors
We now consider the case in which all sensor readings in Σi,s may become faulty. For such a purpose, we first
aim at constructing the DFA model of G0i , namely G
F,s
i , that characterizes the behaviors of G
0
i in the presence of
loss of sensor readings in Σi,s. Specifically, we first build the counterpart of Gi,k in the multi-fault case as follows:
Gi,F = (Qi,F ,Σi,F , δi,F ), (26)
where Qi,F = {qi,F,l|qi,l ∈ Qi} is a copy of Qi, Σi,F = Σi∪ΣFi,s∪Σfi,s, and the transition function δi,F is defined
as follows: for any qi,F,l ∈ Qi,F and σ ∈ Σi,F ,
δi,F (qi,F,l, σ) =

qi,F,l′ , if σ 6∈ Σfi,s ∧ δi(qi,l, σ) = qi,l′ ;
qi,F,l′ , if σ = σ
f
i,k ∈ Σfi,s∧
δi(qi,l, σi,k) = qi,l′ .
Therefore, similar to (18), the DFA model of Gi in the presence of multiple sensor faults can be obtained as
GFi = (Q
F
i ,Σ
F
i , δ
F
i , q
F
i,0), (27)
where QFi = Qi∪Qi,F , ΣFi = Σi,F , qFi,0 = qi,0, with the transition function δFi = δi∪δi,F ∪{(qi,l, fi,k, qi,k,l)|qi,l ∈
Qi, fi,k ∈ ΣFi,s}.
On the other hand, the DFA model SFi of Si in the multi-fault is computed, and we have
Si,F = (Xi,F ,Σi,F , ξi,F ),
where Xi,F = {xi,F,l|xi,l ∈ Xi}, and for any xi,F,l ∈ Xi,F and σ ∈ Σi,F , ξi,F (xi,F,l, σ) is formally defined as
ξi,F (xi,F,l, σ) =

xi,F,l′ , if ξi(xi,l, σ) = xi,l′ ;
xi,F,l, if [σ = σ
f
i,k ∈ Σfi,s∧
ξi(xi,l, σi,k)!] ∨ [σ ∈ Σi,uc ∪ Σfi,s
∧¬ξi(xi,l, σ)!].
The unified model of SFi is hence obtained as
SFi = (X
F
i ,Σ
F
i , ξ
F
i , x
F
i,0), (28)
where XFi = Xi ∪Xi,F , ΣFi = Σi,F , xFi,0 = xi,0 and ξFi = ξi ∪ ξi,F ∪ {(xi,l, fi,k, xi,F,l)|xi,l ∈ Xi, fi,k ∈ ΣFi,s}.
Finally, the closed-loop model GF,si is computed in a similar way as (21)
GF,si = S
F
i ‖GFi := (QF,si ,ΣF,si , δF,si , qF,si,0 ), (29)
where the set of post-fault local events is given by ΣF,si = Σi,F and can be further partitioned as
ΣF,si,c = Σi,c,Σ
F,s
i,uc = Σi,uc ∪ Σfi,s ∪ ΣFi,s;
ΣF,si,o = Σi,o,Σ
F,s
i,uo = Σi,uo ∪ Σfi,s ∪ ΣFi,s.
(30)
A sensor fault tolerant control framework is developed in Fig. 10 to resolve the impacts of multiple sensor faults,
where PFi,o : Σ
F,s∗
i → ΣF,s
∗
i,o stands for the post-fault observation projection in the multi-fault case. In the multi-
fault case, the safe diagnoser Gdi can be modified to distinguish different sensor faults by introducing fault labels
corresponding to each sensor fault event. When no sensor fault is detected by Gdi , the subsystem G
F,s
i remains in
the nominal mode. If for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Ki}, the language L(GF,si ) is SF-safe controllable with respect to
PFi,o, fi,k and L
safe
i , the safe diagnoser G
d
i is able to correctly detect the occurrence of fi,k before G
F,s
i generates
any (locally) unsafe behaviors. With slightly abusing the notations, we still denote by FCi the set of first-entered
certain states with respect to all possible sensor fault events in ΣFi,s. Thanks to FCi, we can apply Proposition 1
for the verification of the SF-safe controllability of L(GF,si ) in the presence of multiple sensor faults.
Fig. 10: Sensor fault tolerant control with multiple faults.
When entering a certain state qYi ∈ FCi, the diagnoser reports the occurrence of the corresponding sensor fault
fi,k for some k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Ki} and interrupts the operation of the nominal supervisor Si. In response to the
detection of the sensor fault, the construction procedure for the post-fault uncontrolled subsystem in the single-
fault case can be inherited to compute Gk,si (q
Y
i ), while the post-fault control specification is obtained as (25). The
solvability of the fault tolerant control problem under multiple sensor faults is presented as follows.
Theorem 6: There exists a post-fault supervisor SF,si (q
Y
i ) after G
d
i evolves to a certain state q
Y
i that drives the
post-faul subsystem GF,si (q
Y
i ) to satisfy L
post
i (q
Y
i ) (25) under arbitrary order of loss of sensor readings in Σi,s
if and only if language inf CF,si ({}), computed with respect to L(GF,si (qYi )) and ΣF,si,uc ∪ {detectj |qij ∈ qYi },
satisfies that inf CF,si ({}) |= Lposti (qYi ).
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Theorem 1 and is omitted here.
The notion SFi ‖GFi is also adopted here to represent the overall closed-loop model of the subsystem Gi (i ∈ I)
subject to multiple sensor faults. The following theorem states that the active fault tolerant architecture proposed
in Fig. 10 shall ensure the local safety of Gi regardless of faults.
Theorem 7: Consider the subsystem Gi (i ∈ I) subject to possible loss of sensor readings σi,1, σi,2, . . . , σi,Ki .
If for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Ki}, L(Gk,si ) is SF-safe controllable with respect to PFi,o, fi,k and Lsafei and for each
qYi ∈ FCi, L(Gk,si (qYi )) is sensor fault tolerant with respect to fi,k and Lposti (qYi ), then the nominal supervisor
Si and the post-fault supervisor S
F,s
i will jointly enforce the fulfillment of local safety requirement L
safe
i , i.e.,
SFi ‖GFi |= Lsafei .
Proof: By definition, the behaviors L(SFi ‖GFi ) of the subsystem Gi in the presence of multiple sensor faults
should be the concatenation of three parts: the nominal behaviors of Gi under the supervision of Si before the
occurrence of the fault, the behaviors generated after the occurrence but before the detection of the fault, and
the behaviors generated by the post-fault subsystem controlled by SF,si . More specifically, L(Si‖Gi) should be
represented as the following form:
L
(
SFi ‖GFi
)
=
{
sifi,ktidetectjt′i
}
,
where si ∈ L(G0i ) is the string generated before fi,k, ti ∈ L(Gk,si ) ∩ Ψ(fi,k) is the string executed by Gk,si in
the faulty mode but before fi,k is detected, and t′i is the string generated by the post-fault controlled subsystem
SF,si (q
Y
i )‖GF,si (qYi ) if Gdi enters a certain state qYi . In other words, si ⊆ Li ⊆ Lsafei and sifi,kti |= Lsafei can be
guaranteed due to the SF-safe controllability of L(Gk,si ) for each k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,Ki}. Furthermore, when evolving
to any fault certain state qYi , the sensor fault tolerance property can assure the existence of a post-fault supervisor
SF,si (q
Y
i ) that satisfies L
post
i (q
Y
i ) in the faulty mode in the presence of Σ
F,s
i,uc and Σ
F,s
i,uo; therefore, recall (25), we
can write that
detectjt′i ⊆ Lposti (qYi )/(siti)
for some j such that there exists qij ∈ qYi . Let PF,si denote the natural projection from [ΣFi ∪{detectj |qij ∈ qYi }]∗
to Σ∗i . It then follows that
PF,si
[
L(SFi ‖GFi )
]
=
{
sitit′i
}
⊆ Lsafei , (31)
which is equivalent to SFi ‖GFi |= Lsafei .
D. Supervisory Control with Combinations of Faults
So far, we have only considered one singe type of faults that may occur in a subsystem. In this subsection,
we aim at extending the proposed fault tolerant control approaches to take both actuator and sensor faults into
consideration. Without loss of generality, we consider a subsystem Gi (i ∈ I) in which both Σi,s = {σi} and
Σi,a = {ηi} are singletons. We assume that the sensor fault occurs before the actuator fault, and the fault tolerance
of the supervisory control strategy of Gi is sketched as follows. Note that our methodology can be generalized to
other combinations of faults. (1) When no fault is detected in Gi, the nominal supervisor Si is employed such that
L(G0i ) = Li ⊆ Lsafei . With ΣFi,s = {fi} and Σfi,s = {σfi }, we can construct the fault-pruned model GF,si of G0i .
Furthermore, GF,si is monitored by the safe diagnoser G
d
i .
(2) If L(GF,si ) is SF-safe controllable and G
d
i detects the occurrence of the sensor fault fi by entering a certain
state qYi ∈ FCi, the operation of the nominal supervisor Si can then be disabled before generating any unsafe
behaviors. Facing the post-fault model GF,si (q
Y
i ) of the uncontrolled subystem and the post-fault specification
Lposti (q
Y
i ), the sensor fault tolerant supervisor S
F,s
i (q
Y
i ) can be synthesized and implemented online, provided that
L(GF,si (q
Y
i )) is sensor fault tolerant with respect to fi and L
post
i (q
Y
i ). After switching to S
F,s
i , we denote by
SFi ‖GFi the overall closed-loop subsystem.
(3) We further assume that ti ∈ L(SFi ‖GFi ) is generated when the actuator fault event hi is detected. In this
case, we set GF
suf
i (ti) as the uncontrolled post-fault plant and the post-fault specification is updated as L
post
i =
Lsafei /P
F,s
i (ti) as the post-fault specification, where P
F,s
i is defined in Theorem 7. In this faulty mode, we update
the local event sets as (6) and (7) accordingly, and if actuator fault tolerance of L(GF
suf
i (ti)) is satisfied, we can
switch to a second post-fault supervisor SF,ai that assures local safety with the faulty actuator and sensor.
For brevity of presentation, we still use SFi ‖GFi (i ∈ I) as a unified notation to represent the closed-loop
subsystem in the presence of combinations of faults. The following theorem, suggesting that the integration of the
fault tolerant control techniques jointly enforce the local safety of a subsystem subject to faults, can be viewed as
an immediate result by following the conclusions of Theorem 3 and Theorem 7.
Theorem 8: For the subsystem Gi (i ∈ I) that is subject to actuator faults in ΣFi,a and sensor faults in ΣFi,s, the
proposed fault tolerant techniques depicted in Fig. 3 and Fig. 10 will result in SFi ‖GFi |= Lsafei .
VI. ASSUME-GUARANTEE POST-FAULT COORDINATION OF DISTRIBUTED DESS
Theorem 8 guarantees that local safety of each subsystem can be enforced after switching to post-fault su-
pervisor(s). Nevertheless, undesirable behaviors may still arise when post-fault subsystems are coordinated with
the nominal ones, leading to the violation of the global specification L. We resolve this concern in this section by
developing fault tolerant coordination strategies among the subsystems . In particular, an assume-guarantee paradigm
[23] is exploited to efficiently refine the local supervisors in order to achieve the global specification.
A. Essentials of Compositional Verification
We first review the completion DFAs in the compositional verification procedures that are presented in [23].
Definition 9 (Completion): Given G = (Q,Σ, δ, q0, Qm) with an “error” state qe 6∈ Q, the completion of G is
defined as a DFA G˜ = (Q˜,Σ, δ˜, q0, Qm) with Q˜ = Q ∪ {qe}, and
∀q˜ ∈ Q˜, σ ∈ Σ, δ˜(q˜, σ) =
δ(q˜, σ), if q˜ ∈ Q ∧ δ(q˜, σ)!,qe, otherwise.
It can be shown that L(G˜) = Σ∗ and Lm(G˜) = Lm(G). The complement of a DFA G over Σ, written as coG,
is a DFA such that Lm(coG) := Σ∗−Lm(G) and can be constructed by swapping the marked states of G˜ with its
non-marked states and vice versa. Recall Definition 1, it is shown in [23] that a system M violates a property P
if and only if the error state qe is reachable in M‖P˜ , where P˜ is the completion of P .
An assume-guarantee formula is a triple 〈A〉M〈P 〉, where M is the system, P is the property to be verified and
A is an assumption about M ’s environment, each of which is represented by a corresponding DFA. The formula
holds if whenever M is part of a system satisfying A, the system must also guarantee the property P , i.e., ∀E,
E‖M |= A implies that E‖M |= P [27]. It is shown in [27] that when ΣP ⊆ ΣA∪ΣM , 〈A〉M〈P 〉 if and only if qe
is unreachable in A‖M‖P˜ , i.e., M‖A |= P . A series of symmetric and asymmetric proof rules are incorporated for
the assume-guarantee paradigm. When M = ‖i∈IMi is a system that is composed of n components, the following
symmetric proof rule SYM-N [27] is adopted:
i = 1, . . . , n 〈Ai〉Mi〈P 〉
i = n+ 1 Lm(coA1‖coA2‖ · · · ‖coAn) ⊆ L(P )
〈true〉M1‖M2‖ · · · ‖Mn〈P 〉
where Ai is the assumption about Mi’s environment and coAi is the complement of Ai. For i ∈ I , we require that
ΣP ⊆
⋃
i∈I Σi = Σ and ΣAi ⊆
(⋂
i∈I Σi
) ∪ ΣP . It is shown that the SYM-N proof rule is sound and complete
[27].
The assumption A in an assume-guarantee formula need not be unique, and we are particularly interested in the
weakest assumption about a system’s environment. Formally, when n = 2, the weakest assumption is defined as
follows.
Definition 10 (Weakest Assumption): [27] Let M1 and M2 be two system components defined over Σ1 and Σ2,
respectively, and P be a property defined over ΣP . Let ΣA := (Σ1∪ΣP )∩Σ2 be an interface alphabet, the weakest
assumption for M1 is a DFA Aw defined over ΣA such that for any component M2, 〈true〉M1‖PA(M2)〈P 〉 if and
only if 〈true〉M2〈Aw〉, where PA denotes the natural projection from Σ∗2 to Σ∗A.
For each i ∈ I , let Σ−i :=
⋃
j∈I−{i} Σj denote the set of events that belong to all the subsystems except Gi.
By setting M−i = ‖j∈I−{i}Mj and ΣAi = (Σi ∪ ΣP ) ∩ Σ−i, the weakest assumption Ai with respect to Mi,
M−i and P can be constructed according to Definition 10. Note that the number of states of Ai is generally less
than the number of states of Mi; therefore, deployment of the assume-guarantee reasoning can efficiently justify
‖i∈IMi |= P by avoiding the computation of the parallel composition ‖i∈IMi.
B. Fault Tolerant Coordination of Distributed DESs
In this subsection, we propose an assume-guarantee scheme to coordinate nominal subsystems with subsystems
after switching to post-fault supervisor(s). To apply the SYM-N proof rule for the coordination of the controlled
distributed DES, we use L ⊆ Σ∗ as the property to be verified and let Mi := G0i (i ∈ I) denote component module
of the controlled subsystem in the nominal mode. In this case, the weakest assumption Ai with respect to Mi and
L is a DFA that is defined over ΣAi := Σ−i. Since the SYM-N rule is sound and complete, all the assumptions
Ai (i ∈ I) jointly satisfy the (n+ 1)-th premise of the SYM-N proof rule.
For the sake of simplicity of presentation, we assume that operation of one subsystem Mi (i ∈ I) suffers
from possible actuator/sensor faults and switches to a post-fault supervisor. The post-fault counterpart of Mi,
written as MFi , is defined as a DFA that satisfies L(M
F
i ) = P
F
i
[
L(SFi ‖GFi )
] ⊆ Σ∗i , where PFi denotes the
natural projection from ΣF
∗
i to Σ
∗
i . According to Definition 1,
[‖j∈I−{i}(Sj‖Gj)] ‖(SFi ‖GFi ) |= L reduces to(‖j∈I−{i}Mj) ‖MFi |= L. The weakest assumption with respect to the post-fault subsystem module MFi and the
global specification L, written as AFi , is also defined over Σ−i and can be computed accordingly via existing
methods [23].
The assume-guarantee paradigm for the post-fault coordination among the subsystems of G is illustrated in
Fig. 11. The proposed coordination scheme first seeks to maintain the global specification even in the presence
Fig. 11: Fault tolerant assume-guarantee coordination.
of a subsystem with post-fault local supervisor(s). The following proposition states the necessary and sufficient
condition under which the successful coordination can be ensured without further supervisor refinement.
Proposition 2:
(‖j∈I−{i}Mj) ‖MFi |= L if and only if Lm [(‖j∈I−{i}coAj)‖coAFi ] ⊆ L.
Proof: On the one hand, defined over Σ−i, AFi is the weakest assumption such that the i-th premise of the
SYM-N proof rule, 〈AFi 〉MFi 〈L〉, is satisfied. Furthermore, for each j ∈ I − {i}, the j-th premise of the SYM-N
rule, 〈Aj〉Mj〈L〉, holds automatically. If Lm
[
(‖j∈I−{i}coAj)‖coAFi
] ⊆ L, the (n+ 1)-th premise of the SYM-N
rule is satisfied and
(‖j∈I−{i}Mj) ‖MFi |= L is enforced by the soundness of the SYM-N proof rule.
On the other hand, if
(‖j∈I−{i}Mj) ‖MFi |= L holds, then for the weakest assumptions Aj (with respect to Mj
(j ∈ I − {i}) and L) and AFi (with respect to MFi and L), premises 1 through n of the SYM-N proof rule are
satisfied. Therefore, serving as the (n+ 1)-th premise of the SYM-N proof rule, Lm
[
(‖j∈I−{i}coAj)‖coAFi
] ⊆ L
is assured by the completeness of the SYM-N proof rule.
If Proposition 2 cannot be satisfied, we need to figure out how to refine the controlled behaviors of both the
nominal and faulty subsystem equipped with the post-fault supervisor. The coordination architecture shown in Fig. 11
implements the refinement by associating each subsystem with a coordination supervisor SCOi (i ∈ I). For the
nominal subsystems, we reconfigure the control policies of the nominal subsystems and define MCOj = S
CO
j ||Gj
(j 6= i) as the component module; whereas the component module MCOi of the post-fault subsystem SFi ‖GFi is
defined as a DFA over ΣFi such that L(M
CO
i ) = P
F
i
[
L(SCOi ‖SFi ‖GFi )
]
. Let ACOi and A
CO
j denote the weakest
assumptions (with respect to L) for MCOi and M
CO
j (j 6= i), respectively. Furthermore, we assume an “infimally
permissive” supervisor Sinfi (i ∈ I) to realize either inf Cj({}) (computed with respect to Gj and Σj,uc (j 6= i))
or inf CFi ({}) (computed with respect to SFi ‖GFi and ΣFi,uc). We refer to M infi and Ainfi (i ∈ I) as the component
module and the weakest assumption DFAs when the coordination supervisor SCOi reduces to S
inf
i , respectively.
The following theorem derives the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of the SCOi ’s in terms of
Ainfi (i ∈ I).
Theorem 9: There exists a coordination supervisor SCOi for each subsystem Gi (i ∈ I) such that ‖i∈IMCOi |= L
if and only if Lm
(‖i∈IcoAinfi ) ⊆ L.
Proof: Suppose that Lm
(‖i∈IcoAinfi ) ⊆ L, where Ainfi is the weakest assumption with respect to M infi and
L. The soundness of the SYM-N proof rule implies that ‖i∈IMCOi |= L, which suggests that Sinfi (i ∈ I) suffice
to be a satisfactory coordination superviso.
Conversely, suppose that there exists a coordination supervisor SCOi for either S
F
i ‖GFi or Gj (j 6= i) to jointly
satisfy the global specification L. By definition, L(M infi ) ⊆ L(MCOi ) always holds for each i ∈ I . Hence, we can
write that
L(M infi ‖ACOi ) = L(M infi )‖L(ACOi )
⊆ L(MCOi )‖L(ACOi ) ⊆ L,
which implies that 〈ACOi 〉M infi 〈L〉; that is, ACOi is an appropriate assumption with respect to M infi and L. Since
Ainfi is the weakest assumption, A
CO
i is stronger than A
inf
i and thus L(A
CO
i ) ⊆ L(Ainfi ). Furthermore, since all
the states in ACOi and A
inf
i are marked, L(A
CO
i ) ⊆ L(Ainfi ) implies that Lm(coAinfi ) ⊆ Lm(coACOi ). Therefore,
we have that
Lm
(‖i∈IcoAinfi ) = ‖i∈ILm(coAinfi )
⊆ ‖i∈ILm(coACOi ) = Lm
(‖i∈IcoACOi ) ⊆ L
where the last inclusion is enforced by the satisfaction of ‖i∈IMCOi |= L and the completeness of the SYM-N rule.
The proof is hence completed.
The intuition behind Theorem 9 states that if the infimally feasible behaviors performed by each subsystem in
the fault operation cannot jointly maintain the global specification, there is no other way to achieve a successful
coordination.
Starting from the component modules Mj (j 6= i) and MFi , the coordination procedure shown in Fig. 11 states
as follows:
(1) Following the detection of actuator/sensor faults, the subsystem Gi switches to the post-fault supervisor SFi
to satisfy the local safety requirement Lsafei and the post-fault component module M
F
i is computed. With M
F
i and
L, the weakest assumption AFi can be obtained and the satisfaction of Proposition 2 is justified. If Proposition 2 is
satisfied, the fulfillment of L is still maintained and no supervisor refinement is required.
(2) If Proposition 2 fails to be satisfied, we apply Theorem 9 to determine whether or not the global specification
can be accomplished by synthesizing appropriate coordination supervisor for each subsystem. If the coordination
supervisors do exist, we compute the coordination supervisor SCOi (i ∈ I) for SFi ‖GFi and Gj (j 6= i) by applying
the following counterexample-guided synthesis algorithm named SYN-CO1.
1SYN-CO stands for “synthesis for coordination
Algorithm 1: The SYN-CO Algorithm
Input: MFi , Gj (j 6= i), ΣFi , Σj , and L
Output: MCOi and SCOi (i ∈ I)
1: Initialization: MCOi ←MFi , MCOj ←Mj (j 6= i)
2: Compute ACOi such that 〈ACOi 〉MCOi 〈L〉 (i ∈ I)
3: if Lm
(‖i∈IcoACOi ) ⊆ L then
4: return SCOi and MCOi (i ∈ I)
5: else
6: MCOi ←MFi , MCOj ← Gj (j 6= i)
7: Compute ACOi such that 〈ACOi 〉MCOi 〈L〉 (i ∈ I)
8: end if
9: while Lm
(‖i∈IcoACOi ) 6⊆ L do
10: A counterexample c ∈ Σ∗ is returned by the compositional verification procedure
11: Ltempi ← L(MCOi )− Pi(c) (i ∈ I)
12: LCOi ← Ltempi − (Σ∗i − Ltempi )Σ∗i (i ∈ I)
13: Compute a maximally permissive coordination supervisor SCOi such that S
CO
i ‖SFi ‖GFi |= LCOi
14: Compute a maximally permissive coordination supervisor SCOj such that S
CO
j ‖Gj |= LCOj (j 6= i)
15: Update MCOi (i ∈ I)
16: Compute ACOi with respect to M
CO
i and L
17: end while
18: return SCOi and MCOi (i ∈ I)
The working procedure of the SYN-CO algorithm is explained as follows. First, MCOi and M
CO
j (j 6= i) are
initialized to be MFi and Mj (lines 1 and 2), respectively. Whenever Lm
(‖i∈IcoACOi ) ⊆ L holds, the fulfillment
of L is assured automatically by Proposition 2 (lines 3 and 4). Otherwise, we aim at the synthesis of coordination
supervisors and set MCOj to be Gj for the nominal subsystems (lines 5 to 8). If Lm
(‖i∈IcoACOi ) 6⊆ L, then
a counterexample c ∈ Σ∗ that causes ‖i∈IMCOi to violate L is returned by the assume-guarantee compositional
verification procedure (lines 9 and 10). The counterexample is utilized to generate new local specification LCOi
for each subsystem by first eliminating Pi(c) from the local behavior L(MCOi ) (line 11) and then computing the
supremal prefix-closed sublanguage of the resulting language (line 12) for each i ∈ I . The candidate coordination
supervisor SCOi is synthesized with respect to the updated L
CO
i accordingly (lines 13 and 14). Finally, we
update the component module for each subsystem in such a way that L(MCOi ) = P
F
i
[
L(SCOi ‖SFi ‖GFi )
]
and
L(MCOj ) = L(S
CO
j ‖Gj) if j 6= i, respectively (lines 15 to 17). The updated component modules are returned
to the compositional verification to determine whether or not ‖i∈IMCOi |= L until no more counterexample is
generated. The following theorem ensures the correctness and termination of the SYN-CO algorithm.
Theorem 10: Given the component modules MFi and Mj (j 6= i), the SYN-CO algorithm terminates and correctly
returns the coordination supervisors SCOi (i ∈ I).
Proof: The termination of the SYN-CO algorithm holds due to the fact that during each iteration, each of the
updated component module MCOi (i ∈ I) possesses a finite number of states regardless of possible faults, and the
deployment of the coordination supervisor SCOi introduces a reduction of the number of states.
Furthermore, it has been shown that the compositional verification with the SYM-N proof rule always terminates
and correctly reports whether or not ‖i∈IMCOi |= L [27]; in other words, when no more counterexample is
generated, we can conclude that ‖i∈IMCOi |= L will not violate the specification L, i.e., the correctness of the
SYN-CO algorithm can be achieved.
Remark 4: It is worth pointing out that although Theorem 10 ensures a correct post-fault coordination strategy
among the subsystems, the SYN-CO algorithm may still come up with a trivial solution, i.e., ‖i∈IMCOi = ∅, which
always solves Problem 1. To prevent this situation from emerging, we abandon the trivial solution returned by the
SYN-CO algorithm; instead, we inherit the post-fault supervisor(s) SFi for G
F
i and the nominal supervisor Sj for
Gj for all j 6= i. In this case, the collective behaviors of G are given by ‖j∈I−{i}Mj‖MFi 6|= L; nevertheless,
from Theorem 8, the coordinated system is still tolerable in the sense that local safety of each subsystem is always
assured while additional computation of the coordination supervisor is not required for the nominal subsystems.
VII. A MULTI-ROBOT COORDINATION EXAMPLE
This section demostrates the effectiveness of the proposed fault tolerant coordination and control framework for
distributed DESs through a more comprehensive example.
Fig. 12: The multi-robot coordination scenario.
Let us consider a multi-robot system that consists of three mobile robots G1, G2 and G3 with identical localization
and communication capabilities. G2 is equipped with fire-extinguishers. All the three robots initially stay in Room
1 in a shared environment as shown in Fig. 12. Room 2 and Room 1 are connected by the one-way door D2 and
the two-way door D1, while Room 3 and Room 1 are connected by D1 and another two-way door D3. D1 is heavy
and should be opened by two robots cooperatively. All doors shall close automatically unless there is an external
force to keep them open.
TABLE I: Events of the Multi-robot System
Event Explanation
hi Robot Gi receives the service request, i = 1, 2, 3.
GitoD1 Robot Gi approaches the door D1, i = 1, 3.
GionD1 Robot Gi at the door D1, i = 1, 3.
Gitok Robot Gi heads for Room k, k = 1, 2, 3.
Giink Robot Gi stays at Room k, k = 1, 2, 3.
OP command for moving forward to open D1.
CL command for moving backward to close D1.
D1open D1 is opened.
D1closed D1 is closed.
r All the robots return to Room 1.
To characterize the behaviors of the robots within the DES framework, the events of this example are defined in
Table 1. The local event set Σi (i = 1, 2, 3) for robot Gi is defined as follows:
Σi = {hi, GitoD1, GionD1, OP,CL,G2in1, Gito3,
Giin3, D1closed,D1open,Gito1, Giin1, r}, i = 1, 3;
Σi = {h2, G2to2, G2in2, D1open,G2to1, G2in1, r}, i = 2.
We assume that G2in1 ∈ Σ1, G2in1 ∈ Σ3 and D1open ∈ Σ2 since they all can be viewed as the information that
is transmitted among G1, G2 and G3 via communication. All the events are assumed to be locally observable in the
nominal mode. The set of each robot’s sensor readings is given by Σi,s := {hi, G2in1, Giin3, Giin1} for i = 1, 3
and Σ2,s := {h2, G2in2, D1open,G2in1}. We also define Σi,a = Σi,c := {GitoD1, GionD1, OP,CL,Gito3, Gito1, r}
as the actuators for i = 1, 3, and let Σ2,a = Σ2,c := {G2to2, G2to1, r} be the set of actuators of G2.
We denote by Gi (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) the DFA model of Gi’s behaviors among the rooms of interest in the environment.
Starting from Room 1, G2 can enter Room 2 through D2 and can also move to Room 3 through D3. When D1
is open by the other two robots, G2 can move to both Rooms 2 and 3 through D1. In this example, we only
consider the possible behaviors of G2 between Rooms 1 to Room 2 and the corresponding model G2 is depicted in
Fig. 13. Similarly, we are interested in the motion behaviors of Gi (i = 1, 3) between Rooms 1 and 3 of the robot
start
h2 G2to2 G2in2 D1open G2to1 G2in1
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Fig. 13: The DFA model of the robot G2.
Gi is shown in Fig. 14. The model of the distributed multi-robot system is then obtained as G = G1‖G2‖G3. In
this example, we assume all the motions of each robot within the given environment as safety behaviors; that is,
Lsafei = L(Gi) (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}).
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Fig. 14: The DFA model of the robot Gi (i = 1, 3).
We assume that a fire alarm is triggered in Room 2. The goal is that G2 must respond promptly to the alarm by
entering Room 2 through D2 and then return to Room 1. Since D2 is a one-way door and cannot open in Room
2, G1 and G3 need to open D1 jointly so that G2 can successfully return. After that, G1 and G3 should close
D1 and return to Room 1 as well. Such a global specification L consists of the following local specifications L
spe
i
(i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) for Gi.
Lspe1 =h1G1toD1G1onD1OPD1openG2in1CLD1closed
G1to1G1in1r;
Lspe2 =h2G2to2G2in2D1openG2to1G2in1r;
Lspe3 =h3G3to3G3in3G3toD1G3onD1OPD1openG2in1
CLD1closedG3to1G3in1r
The global specification L is then given by L = Lspe1 ‖Lspe2 ‖ Lspe3 . To satisfy L jointly, on the one hand, robot G1
stays in Room 1 while G3 goes to Room 3 in order to open D1. On the other hand, G2 should enter Room 2 to
extinguish the fire and then return to Room 1 as long as D1 is open. The nominal supervisors S1, S2 and S3 are
illustrated in Fig. 15, Fig. 16 and Fig. 17, respectively.
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Fig. 15: The nominal supervisor S1.
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Fig. 16: The nominal supervisor S2.
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Fig. 17: The nominal supervisor S3.
It is worth pointing out that Fig. 15, Fig. 16 and Fig. 17 also demonstrate the controlled subsystems G01, G
0
2 and
G03 in the nominal mode, respectively; therefore, L(Si) = Li.
We now study the local fault tolerant control and post-fault coordination of the multi-robot system in the presence
of potential actuator/sensor faults. Herein, we first consider the case in which after receiving the task request h3,
G3 is unable to go to Room 3 to open D1 cooperatively with G1. Such a circumstance may correspond to the
shortage of battery of G3 and can be captured by the controllability loss of the actuator event G3toD1. Since the
corresponding actuator fault event h3,G3toD1 occurs after the execution of h3, the post-fault model of G3 is given
by GF,a3 = G
suf
3 (h3) and is depicted in Fig. 18.
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Fig. 18: The DFA model of the robot Gi (i = 1, 3).
The actuator fault tolerant architecture proposed in Section IV is utilized at this point to synthesize the post-fault
supervisor SF,a3 . In this example, the post-fault specification is given by L
post
3 = L
safe
3 /h3 = L(G3)/h3, and it can
be verified that the necessary and sufficient conditions presented in Theorem 1 can be satisfied. Therefore, there
exists a satisfactory post-fault supervisor SF,a3 , whose DFA representation is shown in Fig. 19, that enforces the
local safety requirement Lsafe3 = L(G3) in the faulty mode.
start
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2 in
1
CLD1closedG3to1G3in1r
Fig. 19: The post-fault supervisor SF,a3 .
Under the supervision of SF,a3 , the robot G3 should stays in Room 1 and open D1. After the post-fault supervisor
reconfiguration, the assume-guarantee coordination framework shown in Fig. 11 is applied to coordinate G3 with
the other two robots. In this case, we can verify that the Proposition 2 cannot hold any more and we need to design
the coordination supervisors for each subsystem. In particular, it is easy to find out that G2 need not reconfigure the
local control policies and SCO2 = S2, whereas the coordination supervisor S
CO
1 can be synthesized for the robot
G1, as shown in Fig. 20
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Fig. 20: The coordination supervisor SCO1 .
In other words, the robot G1 should enter Room 3 to open D1 cooperatively with G3 so that the global task can
be achieved.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we present a fault tolerant coordination and control framework for distributed DESs that are
composed of multiple subsystems. The proposed coordination and control framework ensures the accomplishment
of the global specification in the presence of sensor and actuator faults. By introducing automata-theoretic methods
to characterize the behaviors of each subsystem that is affected by various faults, appropriate post-fault supervisors
are synthesized such that local safety can be ensured. In addition, an assume-guarantee coordination scheme is
exploited to accomplish the global specification after the post-fault supervisor reconfiguration. The effectiveness of
our proposed approach is demonstrated by an illustrative example.
Some problems are of interest for future investigations. For example, extensions of the proposed fault tolerant
coordination and control architecture to combinations of other types of faults are worth of study. In addition to
fault tolerant control problems, coordination and control reconfiguration strategies for distributed DESs subject to
intentional attacks are also expected to be explored.
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